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AESTHETIC ZONING
Zoning restrictions on the private use and enjoyment of property for
the benefit of the community are employed virtually everywhere in this
country today.' But zoning purely for aesthetic purposes2 is judicially
sanctioned in only a handful, although an increasing handful, of
jurisdictions.3 On the one side of the issue lies the individual property
owner's freedom to make aesthetic judgments and, on the other side, the
community's power to determine its aesthetic environment. 4 Opponents
of aesthetic zoning argue that broad agreement upon standards of beauty
is impossible because tastes vary widely from individual to individual, 5
that sufficiently precise standards are impossible to formulate, 6 that
1. See generally I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 1.02, 1.11 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; 8 E. MCQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
25.01-.04 (3d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLIN].
2. "Just what is meant by the use of the term aesthetic is not entirely clear; but apparently
it is intended to designate thereby matters which are evident to sight only, as distinguished
from those discerned through smell or hearing." Sundeen v. Rogers, 83 N.H. 253,258,141
A. 142, 144 (1928). See also Agnor, Beauty Begins a Comeback:Aesthetic Considerations in
Zoning, 11 J. PuB. L. 260 (1962); Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A
Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218, 218-19 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
Dukeminier]; Norton, Police Power, Planning and Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 171,
171-72 (1967); Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment 64 COLUM. L. REv.
81, 82 n.8 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First
Amendment].
3. MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 25.31; Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics
and Objectivity, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 1438, 1441-42 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Beyond
the Eye of the Beholder].
4. Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Mayor& Council of Wilmington v. Turk, 14 Del. Ch. 392,407,129 A. 512,518
(Ch. 1925); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 181, 180 N.E. 767, 773 (1932); Stoner McCray
Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 1319, 78 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1956); Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79,92,299 A.2d 828,835 (1973); City of
Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285,287,62 A.
267, 268 (CL Err. & App. 1905); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 471-73, 191 N.E.2d 272,
277-78, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 741-43 (1963) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting); City of Youngstown
v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661-62, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925); Reid v.
Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67,76, 192 N.E.2d 74, 81(1963) (Corrigan, J.,
dissenting); Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217,226, 104 A.2d 118,122(1954); Comment, The
Aesthetic Factor in Zoning, 11 DUQUESNE L. REv. 204, 206-07 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, The Aesthetic Factor in Zoning]; Comment, Aesthetics as a Zoning
Consideration, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 374, 375, 377 (1962); Note, Beyond the Eye of the
Beholder, supra note 3, at 1442.
6. Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, supra note 2, at 84. But see
Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 3, at 1448-56.
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aesthetic zoning is liable to discriminatory use and enforcement, 7 and
that it has a tendency to stifle imagination and create monotony8
Proponents, on the other hand, argue that without aesthetic zoning,
interesting and unusual neighborhoods, 9 historical sites,'0 scenic
areas," and tourist attractions 2 will be destroyed, that property values
and the tax base will be eroded, 3 and in general, that the community
7. State ex rel. State Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 471, 127
N.E.2d 371, 373 (1955); Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, supra
note 2, at 84; 27 WASH. & LEE L. RFv. 303, 308-09 (1970).
8. See, e.g., People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 472, 191 N.E.2d 272, 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734,
742 (1963) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting); Presnell v. Leslie, 3 N.Y.2d 384, 394, 144 N.E.2d
381, 387, 165 N.Y.S.2d 488, 497 (1957) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting); Reid v. Architectural
Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 76, 192 N.E.2d 74, 81 (1963) (Corrigan, J., dissenting);
Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 3, at 1461. Some municipalities have
employed aesthetic zoning to prevent excessive similarity in subdivision areas. See
Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. Rzv. 26, 30 (1960).
9. See, e.g., Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Naegele Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968); State ex
rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); Village of Larchmont v. Sutton, 30
Misc. 2d 245, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119
Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
10. See note 41 infra.
1. See, e.g., Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, 255 Cal.
App. 2d 765, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968); County of Santa Barbara v. Purcell,
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 169, 59 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Moore v. Ward, 377
S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289
Mass. 149, 187, 193 N.E. 799, 816-17 (1935); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268,270, 169
A.2d 762, 764 (1961). See also Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc. 268
Md. 79, 92, 299 A.2d 828, 835 (1973).
12. See note 42 infra.
13. See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass.
149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 248, 181 A.2d 129,137
(1962); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737
(1963); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); State
ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262,267-70, 69 N.W.2d 217,220-
22 (1955); MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 25.25; Agnor, supra note 2, at 272-73; Anderson,
supra note 8, at 42-44; Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial
Decision Process, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176 (1970); Turnbull, Aesthetic Zoning, 7 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 230 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Turnbull]; Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the
First Amendment, supra note 2, at 91; Comment, The Aesthetic Factor in Zoning, supra
note 5, at 223-33.
"The beauty of a fashionable residence neighborhood in a city is for the comfort and
happiness of the residents, and it sustains in a general way the value of property in the
neighborhood. It is therefore as much a matter of general welfare as is any other condition
that fosters comfort or happiness, and consequent values generally of the property in the
neighborhood." State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271,284,97 So. 440,
444 (1923). This argument, however, is two-sided: zoning can depress property values
when it prevents development which is generally beneficial and desired. See 27 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 303 (1970).
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will be visually polluted.' 4
In Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield' 5 the Superior
Court of New Jersey upheld a zoning ordinance limiting the size,
number, and placement of signs in various districts of the town.
16
Plaintiff car dealer had been denied a permit to erect five signs, 7 each of
which exceeded in area the ten-square-foot maximum, 8 in place of
fifteen old and unsightly signs on the premises. 9 A variance was also
denied.2 0 The proposed signs were not essential to the car dealer's
business; rather, their purpose was to make the premises more attractive,
to maintain sales volume, and to create uniformity of dealership signs
throughout the country.2 1 The plaintiff alleged that the ordinance, as a
purely aesthetic regulation unrelated to the preservation of property
values, was an arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power
in violation of New Jersey law.2 2 The town insisted that the ordinance
14. See generally National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. §
4331(b) (1970); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 18, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970); Note,
Aesthetic Considerations in Land Use Regulation, 2 WILLAMETrE L.J. 420,431-32 (1963).
15. 129 N.J. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113 (L. Div. 1974).
16. Id. at 530-35, 324 A.2d at 114-17. Plaintiff challenged the regulations on signs in the
business area, which permitted: one wall sign, not exceeding the length of the wall or a
height of three feet, at each main entrance of the premises; two signs, together not
exceeding ten square feet in area, painted on doors or windows; signs painted on windows
to give notice of sales or special functions, not exceeding 30% of the window area nor
displayed for more than 75 days each year, and one free-standing sign, not exceeding ten
square feet in area, at each entrance to the parking lot. Wall signs could not project beyond
the top or end of the wall nor more than five inches outward from the surface. After
testimony that it was realistically impossible to meet the five-inch projection limitation
because industry standards mandated that internally illuminated signs be at least six
inches thick, the town admitted that this provision was unreasonable and agreed to revise
it. Id. at 534, 545, 324 A.2d at 117, 123.
17. Id. at 530, 532-33, 324 A.2d at 114, 115-16.
18. Cf. Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960) (court invalidated as
unreasonable an ordinance limiting wall signs not located at point of sale to 300 square
feet and free-standing, non-point of sale signs to 180 square feet).
19. 129 N.J. Super. at 530, 324 A.2d at 114. Under the ordinance plaintiff was not
required to remove nonconforming signs; the ordinance applied only to new signs.
20. Id. at 534, 324 A.2d at 116.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 534, 538-39, 544, 324 A.2d at 116-17, 119, 122. The New Jersey zoning statute
provides:
Such regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed
for one or more of the following purposes: to lessen congestion in the streets; secure
safety from fire, flood, panic and other dangers; promote health, morals or the
general welfare; provide adequate light and air; prevent the overcrowding of land or
1976]
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was necessary to preserve its colonial atmosphere. 23 Declaring that
"[z]oning solely for aesthetic purposes is an idea whose time has
come," 24 the court departed from the state's long-standing rule against
it.
By restricting certain uses to certain areas, zoning regulations are
designed to promote health, safety and convenience, to protect the
usefulness, value and enjoyment of property, and to ensure orderly
community growth.25 Usually, they employ a pyramidal scheme of
ascending exclusiveness: areas zoned at the base of the pyramid permit a
fairly broad range of residential, commercial and industrial uses, while
areas zoned at the apex permit only single-family residential use,
sometimes with a minimum lot-size requirement.2 6The typical.scheme
"prefers" residential over commercial uses and commercial over
industrial uses. Even at the base of the pyramid there are usually some
restrictions on the property owner's freedom of use.27
Due process and equal protection attacks28 on the concept of zoning
were laid to rest in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.29 In upholding
the village's comprehensive zoning scheme, the United States Supreme
Court subordinated the interest of the company in obtaining a higher
price for the land if it were sold for industrial, rather than for residential
use, to the interest of the community in protecting the health and welfare
buildings; avoid undue concentration of population. Such regulations shall be
made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the
district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view of conserving
the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout
such municipality.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (1967).
23. 129 N.J. Super. at 534, 324 A.2d at 116.
24. Id. at 539, 324 A.2d at 119.
25. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 7.01-.11,7.23, 7.25-.36; MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§
25.17, 25.20-.28.
26. See generally 1 & 2 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 8.22-.36.
27. See, e.g., McQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§ 25.96-.146.
28. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Zoning ordinances carry a heavy presumption of validity. See,
e.g., I ANDERSON, supra note I, §§ 2.01, 2.14; McQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§ 25.05,25.34. For
years, since Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Supreme Court refused
to hear a single case challenging the validity of a zoning ordinance. In 1974 the Court
decided Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), upholding an ordinance
restricting land use to single-family dwellings and defining "family" to mean either one or
more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption or not more than two persons not so
related.
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of its residents. 30 The Court thus enshrined the power to zone within the
states' police power,31 the power to regulate conduct in order to promote
health, safety, morals and the general welfare. 32
Because the state or community interest asserted in Euclid was the
protection of health and safety, the Court did not address the question of
aesthetic zoning. Zoning solely for aesthetics could be justified only, if at
all, by the general welfare interest of the community.33 Euclid, therefore,
did not alter judicial resistance to aesthetic zoning, perhaps best
expressed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1905:
No case has been cited, nor are we aware of any case which holds
that a man may be deprived of his property because his tastes are
not those of his neighbors. Aesthetic considerations are a matter of
luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity
alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take
private property without compensation.34
The New Jersey opinion illustrates the early, extreme position that an
ordinance motivated largely by aesthetic considerations is invalid.35 In
30. 272 U.S. at 395-97. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 2.19,2.21-23; MICQUILLIN, supra
note 1, §§ 2540-Al.
31. "With the growth and development of the State the police power necessarily
develops, within reasonable bounds, to meet the changing conditions .... The power is
not circumscribed by precedents arising out of past conditions, but is elastic and capable of
expansion in order to keep pace with human progress." City of Aurora v. Bums, 319111.84,
93-91, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (1925). See also Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603,605 (1927); Village of
Euclidv. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88,395(1926); Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
32. See, e.g., House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270,282 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,
31 (1885); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1876). Compare Mayor & Council of
Wilmington v. Turk, 14 Del. Ch. 392, 401-02, 129 A. 512, 516 (Ch. 1925), with Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See also 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 7.01-.03, 7.12, 7.25-.36;
MCQUILLIN, iupra note 1, §§ 25.17-.28.
33. See I & 2 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 7.12, 9.01-.45.
34. City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72 N.J.L.
285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905).
35. Id. at 285,62 A. at 267. See, e.g., Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867
(1909); Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. City of Denver, 47 Colo. 221,107 P. 261(1910);
Crawford v. City of Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 P. 476 (1893); State ex rel. M. Wineburgh
Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 88 N.E. 17 (1909); National Land& Inv. Co. v.
1976]
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time, however, most courts came to accept aesthetics as a valid secondary
purpose.36 If the ordinance could be supplied with a plausible non-
aesthetic purpose to promote the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the community, it was usually upheld. This remains the
majority rule today: An aesthetic purpose alone does not j ustify a zoning
ordinance which imposes restrictions upon private property; the
ordinance must serve a non-aesthetic purpose as well.3 7 Some courts,
however, accept a minimal non-aesthetic purpose to uphold an aesthetic
ordinance, 8 and some even accept a totally fictional non-aesthetic
purpose.3 9 Moreover, some courts have recognized exceptions to the ban
on purely aesthetic zoning - in the regulation of signs and billboards4 0
Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Comment,
Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, supra note 2, at 83-84; Comment, The
Aesthetic Factor in Zoning, supra note 5, at 206-10.
36. "Beauty may not be queen but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or
respect. She may at least shelter herself under the wing of safety, morality or decency."
Perlmutter v. Green, 259 N.Y. 327, 332, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (1932). MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§
25.29-.30 and cases cited; see Dukeminier, supra note 2, at 219-20; Comment, Zoning,
Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, supra note 2, at 83-84; Comment, The Aesthetic
Factor in Zoning, supra note 5, at 206-10; Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder, supra note
3, at 1439, 1441 & n.18, 1456-57; Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1226-35 (1968).
37. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 7.12, 7.16-.23; McQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§ 25.29-
.30; Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968).
38. The billboard cases, note 40 infra, demonstrate reliance upon minimal non-aesthetic
purposes. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 7.15; McQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 25.31;
Hershman, Beauty as the Subject of Legislative Control, 15 PRAC. LAw. 20, 21-22 (Feb.
1969); Comment, The Aesthetic Factor in Zoning, supra note 5, at 207.
39. When counts have had the opportunity to utilize the aesthetic factor and
conceptually clarify its basic essence, they have often avoided the real aesthetic issue
by resourcefully providing an expedient alternative to justify the exercise of the
police power and to substantiate the result achieved. Consequently, courts have
conveniently furnished a genesis of conflicting attitudes which reveal an artfully
manipulative sophistry and subtly cavalier indifference....
Comment, The Aesthetic Factor in Zoning, supra note 5, at 204. "An analysis of the...
cases indicates that aesthetic zoning has been given judicial approbation only when
clothed with other legal raiment which masked its true purpose." Westfield Motor Sales
Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 539, 324 A.2d 113, 119 (L. Div. 1974). See,
e.g., 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 7.12, 7.23; Dukeminier, supra note 2, at 218; Landels,
Zoning: An Analysis of Its Purposes and Its Legal Sanctions, 17 A.B.A.J. 163 (1931);
Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, supra note 2, at 85.
40. See, e.g., Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); In re Wilshire, 103 F. 620
(S.D. Cal. 1900); Desert Outdoor Advertising v. County of San Bernardino, 255 Cal. App.
2d 765, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220,70 A. 113
(1908); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149,193
N.E. 799 (1935); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn.
492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235
Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court,
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and in the protection of historical sites41 and tourist areas.42 Indeed,
some of the majority rule states give aesthetic zoning the strongest
possible approval short of independent status. 43 Given the proper fact
situation and a well-drawn ordinance, a number of these states might
well change the rule and permit aesthetic zoning per se.
Proponents of aesthetic zoning have long urged a more forthright
acceptance of its value and function in modem zoning law.4 4 Support for
Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151,176 N.E.2d 566,218 N.Y.S.2d640 (1961); City of Rochester v. West, 164
N.Y. 510, 58 N.E. 673 (1900); Norate Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 207
A.2d 890 (1965). But see City of Santa Barbara v. Modem Neon Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 188, 11
Cal. Rptr. 57 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz,
Inc., 268 Md. 79,299 A.2d828 (1973). See also Highway Beautification Act of 1965, § 101(b),
23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1970).
Billboard controls are not actually an exception to the ban on aesthetic zoning, but they
have been upheld so often on health, safety, or morals grounds, often questionable and
sometimes laughable, that there is seldom serious debate on the issue of regulation. See
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, supra at 529; St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of
St. Louis, supra at 145, 137 S.W. at 942. "[R]ealistically, the primary objective of any anti-
billboard ordinance is an esthetic one." Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 269, 225
N.E.2d 749, 753, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 27 (1967). No court in recent times has invalidated an
ordinance prohibiting billboards in residential areas. Holme, Billboards & On-Premise
Signs: Regulation and Elimination under the Fifth Amendment, in INsT. ON PLANNING,
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS 247, 269 (1974).
41. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14,64 So. 2d 798 (1953); City of New
Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852,5 So. 2d 129, (1941); Opinion of theJustices, 333 Mass.
783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955);
Town of Deeringex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481,202 A.2d232 (1964); City of
Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); Manhattan Club v.
Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1966); 2
ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 8.53-.55; Turnbull, supra note 13, at 230; Note, The Police
Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
708 (1963); 29 FORDHAM L. RIv. 729 (1961).
42. See, e.g., Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean &
Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941). See also General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973); Turnbull, supra note 13.
43. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 90 Ariz. 13, 363 P.2d 607 (1961); Bachman v.
State, 235 Ark. 339,359 S.W.2d 815 (1962); Petition of Franklin Builders, Inc., 58 Del. 173,
207 A.2d 12 (1964); Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 611 (Fla. 1960); Rothenberg v.
City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Jasperv. Commonwealth, 375
S.W.2d 709 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47,
199 N.W.2d 525 (1972); State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1971); Piper
v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291, 266 A.2d 103 (1970); Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v.
Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481,202 A.2d 232 (1964); State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128,243 N.E.2d
66 (1968); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262,69 N.W.2d
217 (1955). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968).
44. See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 2,'at219; Norton, supra note2, at 182,187; Steinbach,
supra note 13, at 186.
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Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
this view has often been claimed in Justice Douglas' remarks in Berman
v. Parker.45
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.... The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. 46
Justice Douglas was speaking, however, about a compensated taking
under the eminent domain power of the federal government and not
about an uncompensated taking under the police power of the state.47
Berman by no means provides a new definition of the general welfare
sanctioning aesthetic regulation for any and all occasions.
Nevertheless, some state courts have interpreted Berman as the sign to
change the rule against aesthetic zoning. The first state to move in this
direction was New York, in People v. Stover.48 The court in Stover
upheld an ordinance prohibiting clotheslines in front and side yards
abutting a street. The test of validity, the court held, was whether the
regulation is a reasonable method "of achieving an attractive, efficiently
functioning, properous community - and not upon whether the ob-
jects were primarily aesthetic. '49 Stover, however, did not endorse
aesthetics unequivocally as the sole basis of a valid zoning ordinance.
The endorsement was tempered by a concern for the effect of the
offending use upon property values, 50 a concern which many courts
have voiced in upholding aesthetically based zoning.51 Four years later,
in Cromwell v. Ferrier,52 the New York court proclaimed aesthetics a
fully independent basis for zoning. Upholding a complete prohibition
45. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
46. Id. at 33 (citation omitted). See also McQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§ 25.19-.20.
47. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 7.14; McQUILLIN,supra note 1, §25.42; Agnorsupra
note 2, at 278; Steinbach, supra note 13, at 178-79.
48. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42
(1963). See generally Anderson, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Purposes-An
Appraisal of People v. Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 26 (1963); Comment, Zoning,
Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, supra note 2.
49. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 467, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 738.
50. Id. at 466, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
51. See note 13 supra.
52. 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
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on off-premise signs and billboards, the court based its decision upon
their increasing visual offensiveness and their decreasing effectiveness
compared with other advertising media. 53 In the last decade, Oregon,54
Hawaii, 55 and most recently, New Jersey56 have followed New York's
lead and found aesthetic zoning within the general welfare.5 7 As such,
aesthetic zoning must satisfy due process and equal protection
requirements for police power enactments generally: it must serve a
public, and not a private interest;5 8 it must be rationally formulated59
and fairly administered;60 and the means chosen must be rationally
calculated to achieve the desired purpose.61
At the time of Westfield the New Jersey court's approach was to view
property values as a matter of general welfare and to uphold zoning
regulations designed to preserve them.62 On this basis it is of course
53. Id. at 271-72, 225 N.E.2d at 754-55, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
54. Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965) (ordinance excluding
wrecking yards from city).
55. State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33,429 P.2d825 (1967) (ordinance limiting
size and height of outdoor signs in industrial areas).
56. Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528,324 A.2d 113 (L.
Div. 1974); see note 16 supra.
57. Presumably, Washington, D.C., also permits aesthetic zoning per se under Berman
although as pointed out, see note 47 and accompanying text supra, the case involved
eminent domain and not zoning. See also note 43 and accompanying text supra.
58. See, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 77-81 (1937);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
133 (1876); McQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§ 25.19, 25.42.
59. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270 (1911); MCQUILLIN,
supra note 1, §§ 25.18, 25.42-.43.
60. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,373-74 (1886); 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1,
§ 5.17; McQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§ 25.34, 25A2, 25.61-.62.
61. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Sligh v. Kirkwood,
237 U.S. 52, 61 (1915); McQuiLLIN, supra note 1, §§ 25.18, 25.42.
62. See note 22 supra. In Westfield the court stated, 129 N.J. Super. at537-38,324 A.2d at
118-19, that the Passaic rationale, see note 34 and accompanying text supra, was followed
until 1952, at which time the court adopted a broad view of the general welfare and upheld
an ordinance fixing minimum floor space for various types of housing- "[S]o long as the
ordinance was reasonably designed, by whatever means, to further the advancement of a
community as a social, economic and political unit, it is in the general welfare and
therefore a proper exercise of the zoning power." Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne
Township, 10 N.J. 165, 172, 89 A.2d 693, 697 (1952). "The unique feature of Lionshead,"
said the Westfield court, "was that it focused attention upon the interrelationship of
aesthetic considerations and property values." 129 N.J. Super. at 538, 324 A.2d at 119. In
United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964), the state supreme
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possible to justify a great deal of aesthetic zoning, for almost every
zoning enactment, from the regulation of yard set-backs to industrial
uses, has an impact on both the aesthetics and the economics of the
community.0 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, ten years before, had
upheld an ordinance banning all off-premise advertising signs in a
small, image-conscious, residential community like Westfield, saying:
"There are areas in which aesthetics and economics coalesce, areas in
which a discordant sight is as hard an economic fact as an annoying odor
or sound." 64 Justice Hall, the lone dissenter in the case, would have
based the decision squarely upon aesthetics alone. 65 Apparently his
argument convinced the Westfield court, for it could have upheld the
ordinance on the established rationale of protecting property values in
the business district, or in adjacent residential areas onto which large
signs would project, or in the community as a whole. Instead, the court
attributed the ordinance to "aesthetic considerations alone" 66 and found
these a sufficient end in themselves.
The court criticized the bulk of prior decisions on aesthetic zoning as
obscure, old-fashioned and timid.67 Initially, the court pointed out,
zoning ordinances enacted for aesthetic purposes were struck down as a
deprivation of property without due process. 68 Thereafter many courts
found they could circumvent the due process obstacle in one of two ways:
either by expanding the general welfare concept to permit aesthetic
court declared, surprisingly, in view of theclarity and prominence of Passaic: "[T]he issue
[of aesthetic zoning] may be said to be unexplored in our State," and then went on to
uphold a ban on off-premise signs on the Lionshead rationale. Id. at 5, 198 A.2d at 449.
63. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 216 Cal. App. 2d 270, 273, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 731, 733 (Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 376 U.S. 186 (1963); United Advertising
Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 449 (1964); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v.
Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 542,324 A.2d 113, 121 (L. Div. 1974); People v.
Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462,471, 191 N.E.2d272, 277,240 N.Y.S.2d734, 741(1963) (Van Voorhis,
J., dissenting); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217 (1955); 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 7.12; Anderson, supra note 8; Norton,
supra note 2, at 172; Turnbull, supra note 13; Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder, supra
note 3, at 1451-52; Comment, Zoning: Aesthetics: The Chameleon ofZoning, 4TLsA L.J.
48, 54 (1967); 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1964).
64. United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 449 (1964).
65. Id. at 10-11, 198 A.2d at 452 (Hall, J., dissenting) (contending that ordinance does not
effectually regulate on-premise advertising and hence discriminates unfairly against off-
premise advertising).
66. 129 N.J. Super. at 535, 324 A.2d at 117.
67. Id. at 538-44, 324 A.2d at 119, 122.
68. Id. at 534, 324 A.2d at 117-18; see note 35 supra.
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zoning directed at the protection of property values orby acquiescing in
the disguise of the aesthetic purpose of the ordinance beneath a dubious
health or safety justification. 69 By legitimizing aesthetic zoning per se,
the court proposed to end these "subterfuges. ' 70 At the same time, the
court insisted that the concept of the general welfare had evolved to the
point that it could attend directly to the aesthetic well-being of the
community.7 1
In freeing aesthetic zoning from the requirement of a non-aesthetic
justification, the court also freed aesthetic zoning from limitations as to
scope and application. Recognizing the significance of this step, the
court cautioned that aesthetic zoning must be subject to "proper
safeguard." 72 The court, however, gave no intimation of any such
safeguard, except for scrutiny by the courts as to the reasonableness of
the ordinance in achieving its goals. 3 Such a standard does not address
the prior question of the reasonableness of the goals, and it provides
little direction for judging, drafting, or challenging aesthetic zoning
legislation. Moreover, as a general rule, the court will not interfere with
the legislative determination of goals and the means to effect them
unless they are clearly arbitrary.7 4 Even so, the victim of unreasonable
aesthetic zoning is benefited by the court's decision to the extent that he
can concentrate his challenge on the reasonableness of the ordinance
without confronting health, safety or economic justifications invented
for the sake of the lawsuit.7 5
69. Id. at 536-39, 324 A.2d at 118-19; see notes 38-39 supra.
70. Id. at 539, 324 A.2d at 119.
71. Id. at 539-41,324 A.2d at 120-21. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26(1954); State
v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33,429 P.2d 825 (1967); State ex Tel. Civello v. City of
New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128
N.E.2d 557 (1955); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289
Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18
(1938); People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485 (1930); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241
N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35,400 P.2d 255 (1965); State
ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
72. 129 N.J. Super. at 539, 324 A.2d at 119.
73. Id. at 544, 324 A.2d at 122. On reasonableness as a measure of zoning validity see
MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 25.43. See also note 29 supra.
74. 129 N.J. Super. 544-45,324 A.2d at 122-23. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1,
198 A.2d 447 (1964).
75. 129 N.J. Super. at 543-44, 324 A.2d at 122. See Anderson, Regulation ofLand Usefor
Aesthetic Purposes - An Appraisal of People v. Stover, 15 SYRIcusE L. REv. 26, 33-40
(1963).
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The ordinance upheld in Westfield would not itself seem unduly
restrictive or oppressive. While limiting the size,7 6 number and
placement of signs, it leaves the businessman free to put on his signs
whatever he chooses. Moreover, the ordinance provides for variances in
cases of hardship. Nor is the ordinance entirely without benefit to the
businessman; it reduces the costly and self-defeating competition for the
biggest and best sign. Perhaps, too, the ordinance will strengthen
Westfield's business community by creating an environment especially
appreciated by some shoppers. An ordinance which prohibited all signs
in the business district, with no provision for variances, would be an
entirely different matter.7 7 The difficulty with the court's opinion is that
it provides no means of distinguishing between reasonable and
unreasonable aesthetic restrictions.
In view of the aesthetic-economic interrelationship of zoning
enactments, the judicial tendency to classify them as one or the other and
to admit some, but not others, to the general welfare class is at times
difficult to understand. Similarly, the Westfield court's effort to
disentangle aesthetics and property values seems more than the situation
requires.7 8 Furthermore, most of the arguments against aesthetic zoning
are readily answered. Recent studies indicate that even in the subjective
area of aesthetic judgment, it is possible to achieve a fairly high degree of
consensus on architectural and scenic beauty.7 9 Some measure of
protection against unreasonable and capricious regulations is provided
by constitutional due process and equal protection. 80 The confiscatory
effect of aesthetic zoning can be mitigated, at least in part, by a
reasonable period of amortization for non-conforming uses.81 If the
76. See note 16 supra. Note that the ordinance, while limiting to three feet the height of a
sign mounted to a wall at an entrance, does not limit the length of the sign, and thus,
would permit a fairly large sign on a long wall. A model ordinance for regulating signs is
proposed in W. EWALD & D. MANDELKER, STREET GRAPHICS 85-105 (1971).
77. See Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 3, at 1458.
78. Some courts and writers suggest the two should not be disentangled, that effect upon
property values operates as a practical measure of and restraint upon aesthetic regulation.
See note 13 supra.
79. Kaplan, Kaplan & Wendt, Rated Preference and Complexity for Natural and Urban
Visual Material, 12 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSiCS 354 (1972); Shafer, Hamilton & Schmidt,
Natural Landscape Preferences: A Predictive Model, 1 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 1 (1969); Note,
Beyond the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 3, at 1442-48. See also Dukeminier, supra note
2, at 226-27.
80. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
81. Note that in the Westfield ordinance there was an unlimited period of amortization
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individual's right of aesthetic judgment is worth protecting, so too is the
community's interest in exercising some control over judgments that
affect it.82 Much of the problem here, with regard not only to the issue of
aesthetic freedom, but also to the issues of consensus, due process, and
confiscation, arises from judicial failure to develop criteria for
evaluating the reasonableness of aesthetic regulations. This failure
results from the uncritical classification of ordinances merely as
aesthetic or non-aesthetic in purpose. Not all aesthetic regulations
deprive the individual of aesthetic freedom or of the use of his property
to the same extent, nor do they all demand an unreasonable and rigid
conformity. Greater accommodation is possible, one suspects, between
the aesthetic interests of the individual and the community, both in
states which do permit aesthetic zoning and in states which do not, than
has been achieved or often supposed.
Theodore Guberman
as the ordinance applied only to new signs. See note 19 supra. New York City and Prince
George's County, Md., provide abatements on real estate taxes to encourage preservation
of historic sites and scenic areas, respectively. Hershman, supra note 38, at 30, 33.
Hershman cites with dismay Joseph E. Seagram 8c Sons, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 18 App. Div.
2d 109,238 N.Y.S.2d 228, ajf'd, 14 N.Y.2d 314,200 N.E.2d 447, 251 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1963), in
which the court approved a higher assessment than usual on the Seagram Building,
because of its "prestige" value, thereby discouraging architectural excellence. Hershman,
supra note 38, at 33-34. See Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation:Some
Suggestions, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 628; Moore, The Acquisition and Preservation of Open
Lands, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 274,280 (1966); 9 URBAN L. ANN. 303 (1975). Of course the
community could also purchase property it wanted to protect, but such a course is not
possible for most communities. See generally 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§ 6.64-.71. Less
costly alternatives are purchase of conservation easements and compensatory regulations.
See Note, Aesthetic Considerations in Land Use Planning, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 126, 143-44
(1970).
82. See, e.g., 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 7.24; MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, §§ 25.40-.41.
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